And if someone dragged (ßlkoi) him away from there by force (b¤&), up the rough, steep path, and didn't let him go until he had dragged him out ( §jelkÊseien) into the sunlight, wouldn't he be pained and irritated at being dragged (•lkÒ-menon). (515c4-516a1) This climactic wrench from the visible to the intelligible realm is the most profound of the intellectual transitions described in the allegory, and it receives the most emphatic invocation of compulsion. Once the upper world is reached, the language of force drops away, as does any reference to an agent leading the former prisoner: once we are fully in contact with intelligible realities, ascent is apparently a self-sustaining process. The language of compulsion returns later, however, applied to the ascent as a whole: 'It is our task as founders, then, to compel (énagkãsai) the best natures to reach the study we said before is the most important, namely to make the ascent and see the good, and when they have ascended and seen sufficiently, not to allow them to do as they are allowed to now ' (519c8-d2) . This final compulsion, by which the enlightened Guardians are forced to return to the cave (520a8, e2, 521b7, 539e4, 540b4), has been the subject of intense interpretive debate, but little note has been taken of the fact that it is only the second half of the story-compulsion has all along been equally prominent in the upward trajectory. 6 Later in book 7, as I will discuss shortly, compulsion is again prominent in Plato's account of the Guardians' curriculum. And in concluding the book 7 account of education as a whole, Plato again reaffirms that the Guardians' ascent is compelled: 'Then, at the age of fifty, those who've survived the tests and been successful both in practical matters and in the sciences must be led to the goal and compelled (énagkast°on) to lift up the radiant light of their souls to gaze at what itself provides light for everything ' (540a4-8) .
Now this emphasis on compulsion is surprising. It sits very awkwardly with Socrates' concurrent depiction of the ascent as involving a kind of liberation, with the cave as a prison that itself involves compulsion (±nagkasm°noi, 515b1). Moreover, we would have expected unforced ascent to be not only possible but the norm given what Plato says elsewhere in the Republic. As book 9 will 3 explain, knowledge of the Forms is deeply appropriate to our human nature: it involves pleasure of an intensity that puts other pleasures in the shade, because the objects involved are the most real of any we enjoy. Knowledge of the Forms is quite literally the truest fulfilment we can experience (583b-586e). (Indeed, as Phaedrus 249a-c notes, communion with the Forms is constitutive of our humanity in the first place: it is only because of having seen the Forms prior to incarnation that we are human at all.) And compulsion is elsewhere in the Republic the kind of cause that makes a soul behave contrary to its nature. As such it is characteristic of the unjust, unnatural rule of the lower parts: 'But when one of the other parts gains control, it won't be able to secure its own pleasure and will compel (énagkãzein) the other parts to pursue an alien and untrue pleasure' (587a4-6), so that reason is 'dragged along (ßlkasyai) wherever either of the other two leads' (589a1-2). By contrast, when the human reason within us has control, it cares for, cultivates, tames and makes friends of the lower parts (586e-507a, 589a-b). Compulsion is what drags its object, awkwardly and painfully, riding roughshod over its own natural inclinations. And so we would expect the Cave to depict ascent to the upper world as a natural, harmonious, and deeply desired process, however arduous it might be.
How then are we to explain Plato's odd emphasis on compulsion in the ascent from the cave? One possible explanation comes with the subsequent discussion of the Guardians' curriculum, where compulsion is again a guiding thread. The studies that will bring about their educational ascent are repeatedly said to be compulsory, and they are themselves described as compelling. The two claims are connected. Arithmetic is to be the first compulsory subject (énagka›on, 522e1, 525b2) precisely because (like the sight of the great and small mixed up together, 524c) it compels a reorientation of thought from the visible to the intelligible world: 'Then do you see that it's likely that this subject really is compulsory (énagka›on) for us, since it apparently compels (prosanagkãzon) the soul to use understanding itself on the truth itself? ' (526a8-b3, cf. 523d3, 524c7) . In a clear reference back to the Cave, Socrates says that calculation 'leads the soul forcibly (sfÒdra êgei) upward and compels (énagkãzei) it to discuss the numbers themselves', rather than their perceptible instantiations (525d5-8). The same principle is applied to geometry as a candidate study: 'if geometry compels (énagkãzei) the soul to study being, it's appropriate, but if to study becoming, it's inappropriate' (526e7-8, cf. énagkãzei, 526e3). So perhaps Plato's talk of force in the Cave is just designed to prepare us for this equally emphatic motif later on. In that case we are presumably meant to be puzzled by the references to force in the Cave: all will become clear soon enough, when we learn that ascent in the kallipolis will be effected by compulsory study of compelling subjects. 7 But this reading raises puzzles of its own. For one thing, Plato's sketch of the Guardians' curriculum concludes, paradoxically, with a rejection of compulsory education:
…calculation, geometry and all the preliminary education required for dialectic must be offered to the future rulers in childhood, and not in the shape of compulsory ( §pãnagkew) learning either.
Why's that? Because no free person should learn anything like a slave. Forced (b¤&) bodily labour does no harm to the body, but nothing taught by force (b¤aion) stays in the soul.
That's true. Then don't use force (b¤&) to train the children in these subjects; use play instead. That way you'll also see better what each of them is naturally fitted for. (536d4-537a2) Here b¤a, together with the reference to slavery, is more narrowly suggestive of violence and unnatural, physical compulsion than énãgkh; and there is more b¤a than énãgkh in this passage, while the reverse is true in the Cave. Still, both terms occur in both discussions, suggesting that the difference in nuance is insignificant for Plato's purposes; and though the later passage has specific reference to earlier stages of the Guardians' education, the principle enunciated seems to be entirely general. The result is a paradox if not a downright contradiction. How can the ascent to the Forms be compelled, if nothing learned by compulsion will stick?
Now this rejection of compulsory learning must be intended as in the first instance a correction or clarification of the immediately preceding discussion of the curriculum. And it is possible to reconcile the two, if we think more about what it means to call a subject compulsory. ÉAnãgkh with its cognates can cover a broad range: we might best translate it as necessity rather than compulsion, since it includes what is unavoidable or required for some purpose. And this is natural language for statutory requirements: in the present context, the language of compulsion seems to be Plato's way of referring, not to the motivation of the Guardians, but just to the fact that they will be required to pursue the studies in question in order to become Guardians-a sort of hypothetical necessity, as Aristotle will call it (Physics ii 8-9, cf. Phaedo 99a-b). 8 Plato's point is simply that arithmetic (for instance) is not an elective subject: anyone who is to be a Guardian must study it. Socrates' later clarification then reassures us that this does not mean that anybody is going to be forced into anything-dropping out of the Guardian programme is evidently permitted. 9 Those who are by nature not fitted for such studies will thereby be revealed and weeded out all the more eas-5 ily. The clarification also adds that the instruction itself will be non-coercive in style, having the air of play; and this is compatible with the claim that the effect of the study itself is to compel the understanding to ascend to the Forms. 10 A course can be compulsory without anybody being forced to take it; a subject can be compelling without the instruction being coercive. For it must ultimately be the study itself that forces cognition upwards: the only 'force' directly involved in and required for ascent is the force exerted by intellectual activities that redirect our attention to the intelligible realm. However, some prior compulsion may be required to bring us into a position in which such intellectual activities can exert their power: hence Plato's determination to make the most effective studies compulsory. And it is to this kind of prior compulsion that Plato seems to draw our attention with the language of force in the Cave.
This provides a quick, if somewhat superficial solution to our initial problem: the Cave emphasises force in the ascent to prepare the way for its role in the curriculum. But this 'curricular' reading (as I will call it) is unsatisfying on several counts. For one thing, though the Cave does adumbrate the curricular discussion to come, it is not presented as an image of the kallipolis and its educational system. On the contrary: Socrates says that the prisoners are 'similar to us', and that the image depicts 'our nature' (ımo¤ouw ≤m›n, 515a5, t∞n ≤met°ran fÊsin, 514a1-2) in relation to education and the lack of it. This frames the allegory as making a perfectly general point about the difficulty of epistemic progress, given the limitations of human nature and human society. 11 The story to follow is evidently intended to reveal the effect of education as such on human nature, abstracted from any particular individuals, social situations, or educational practices.
So an interpretation of the ascent as 'compelled' in the localized sense 6 explained above cannot be the whole story. Moreover, the compulsion is said to be exerted by some agent-a mysterious τις, 'someone', at 515c6, who releases the prisoner and compels him to turn around; this same agent exerts further compulsion at 515d5, d9 and 515e5-516a1. The forceful agent behaves like a fellow human, interrogating the freed prisoner and dragging him up the path to the light: this does not sound much like the impersonal operation of a curricular requirement. Moreover, Socrates connects this forceful agent with the figure of the returning philosopher. In discussing the unpleasant reception given by the prisoners to anyone returning from the light, he comments: 'Wouldn't it be said of him that he'd returned from his upward journey with his eyesight ruined and that it isn't worthwhile even to try to travel upward? And, as for anyone who tried to free them and lead them upward, if they could somehow get their hands on him, wouldn't they kill him?' (517a2-6). So it is natural to think of the forceful agent as someone who has previously ascended to the upper world himself. And it is hard not to be reminded of the Socrates of the early dialogues, as well as Republic i itself. 12 It seems fair to see Socratic questioning as an attempt to liberate his interlocutors from the shackles of efikas¤a, and to get them to attend to intelligible rather than to superficial perceptible considerations (cf., e.g., Hippias Major 287b-291d, Republic 331b-c, cf. Rep. 476aff.). 13 As Adam (ad loc.) notes, there is also a resonance here with the Theaetetus digression, where the lawyer is depicted as dragged (•lkÊṡ, 175c1) upwards by the philosopher, from gossip about particulars to abstract questions about justice and other intelligible realities (175b-d).
I will refer to this as the 'Socratic' reading; but we need not take the forceful agent to be identified uniquely with Socrates, or even with philosophers as such. Presumably a mathematician or an eristic sophist could also, in their different ways, reorient us from the shadows of unreflective conventional wisdom. As on the 'curricular' reading, it must ultimately be the intellectual activity itself that forces our thought elsewhere; again, Plato's point would be that some prior compulsion is required to put us in a position where this can have its effect.
The Socratic reading gains strong support from Plato's emphasis on the discomfort induced by the forceful agent. Each mention of compulsion in the passage is accompanied by a reference to its unpleasant effects. The freed prisoner is initially 'pained and dazzled and unable to see' (515c8-d1); he is 'at a loss' (d6); 'his eyes hurt' (e1) and he flees the new objects he has been introduced to (e1-3); 7 12 Cf., e.g., Bloom 1968, 406: ' In the account of the cave given here, a man is liberated from his bonds not by his own efforts but by a teacher who compels him to turn to the light. The actual mode of this turning is represented in the action of the Republic.' 13 I take it that the cognition of shadows in the Cave corresponds to efikas¤a in the Line; but just what efikas¤a consists in is unclear and highly controversial (cf. Wilberding 2004 ). If we again take Plato's underdetermination as deliberate, efikas¤a will be any cognition that relates us to objects derivative of and cognitively inferior to everyday sensible particulars, and involves taking them as the only realities. The obvious candidates for such objects are the products of culture-art objects (shown in Republic x to share the ontological status of shadows), clichés, conventional wisdom, and the unreflective assumptions of one's society. and when he is dragged up into the sunlight, he is 'pained and irritated' (515e5-516a3). We might well suspect that the references to compulsion in the Cave are intended primarily as an explanation of this discomfort: pain is the hallmark of force, understood as what moves an object without regard for its natural tendencies. And this is reminiscent of Socrates, given the strong discomfort regularly induced by his questioning (cf. Meno 80a-b). Socrates' interlocutors often do find his interrogations painful, and experience his dialectical practices as coercive (cf. Irwin 1986) . Plato here acknowledges that this reaction is understandable, but urges that Socrates' victims recognise it as the standard side-effect of epistemic transitions, including transitions to a freer and better state. 14 So the talk of force in the Cave seems intended to contribute to Plato's depiction and explanation of resistance to philosophy, an important recurrent theme of Republic v-vii. Together with passages like the image of ship and the stargazer in book 6 (487a-488a), the Cave explains why the philosopher is the object of unjustified (though understandable) scorn and hostility in ordinary societies. The overall point is of course to defuse the outrageousness of Socrates' shocking proposal that if any city is to attain justice and happiness, it must be ruled by philosophers (473c-474a).
This idea of resistance to philosophy brings out an important complication in Plato's view that communion with the Forms is natural to us. At the end of the Cave passage Plato turns to emphasise that education is a kind of redirection of intellectual attention, which involves a reorientation of the entire soul. And of the clever person bent on low ends, he says: if a nature of this sort had been hammered at from childhood and freed from its ties of kinship with becoming, like leaden weights which have been fastened to it by feasting, greed, and other such pleasures and which pull its vision downwards-if, being rid of those, it turned to look at true things, then I say that the same soul of the same person would see these most sharply, just as it now does the things it is presently turned towards.
(519a7-b5) The leaden weights of kinship with becoming, here said to be fastened on by physical pleasures, powerfully recall the chains of the Cave image. Given that the prisoners are 'like us', we must suppose that this bondage is the customary residue of miseducation into any ordinary society. We can achieve freedom from eikasia only with pain and difficulty, by shedding a kind of crust of irrational affective attachments and habits binding us to the body. Plato's claim that epistemic ascent requires liberation from the bodily is not a focus of books 5-7, but the passage I have quoted should suffice to remind us of the fuller treatment given in the Phaedo, where Socrates is emphatic that philosophical wisdom can only be attained to the extent we can disentangle ourselves from the body: 'every pleasure and every pain provides, as it were, another nail to rivet the soul to the body and weld them together. It makes the soul corporeal, so that it believes that truth is what the body says it is' (Phaedo 83d4-7, cf. 64d-67b). Within the framework of the tripartite psychology established in Republic iv, the 'shackle' imagery must represent the domination of the soul by its irrational parts, and in particular appetite, which here replaces the body as the locus of our lowest desires and pleasures. 15 And this involvement of the lower soul and its desires helps to make sense both of our resistance to philosophy and the need for force in the ascent. Ascent means renouncing not only a comfortably unreflective cognitive state but a whole way of life bound up with it, one with distinctive pleasures, values, and attachments (cf. 553c-d, Gorgias 513c-d). But exactly how we are to integrate the tripartite psychology of books 4 and 8-9 with the epistemology of books 5-7, which makes no explicit mention of it, remains a central mystery of the Republic.
So the fact that enlightenment is 'natural' to us does not entail that we are born to it or find it easy to attain. And the fact that communion with the Forms fulfils the deepest needs of our nature does not conflict with the claim that to achieve it involves painful changes, which naturally evoke resistance. What has been welded on by everyday unreflectiveness must be hammered off by intellectual ascesis. Thus an important theme of the Cave passage is that all epistemic transitions are at least temporarily painful and confusing, whether they involve a shift to objects that are more knowable or less so (518a-b). Whatever 'compulsion' may refer to in the Cave, its functional role is as what overcomes our natural resistance to painful change.
However, like the curricular reading, the Socratic reading generates further puzzles in turn. For one thing, postulating a forceful agent as the cause of ascent introduces a regress problem: if one generation of Socratic teachers or philosopher-kings compels the next, how did the first generation ascend? If a teacher is a genuine requirement for ascent, the line of teachers must stretch back ad infinitum, a requirement likely to increase our doubts about the possibility of realising the kallipolis. And Plato elsewhere seems not to believe that a teacher is absolutely necessary for ascent. 16 A further, underlying problem here is that the Cave allegory faces in two directions. As a figurative sketch of the process of enlightenment, it looks forward to the curricular discussion to come later in book 7. At the same time, it also looks back to the very abstract analysis of cognition in the Sun and Line, supplementing them with a diachronic depiction of progress from one epistemic level to 9 15 A referee for Ancient Philosophy suggested (as I understand it) that this is sufficient to explain the absence of eros from the cave: our appetitive bonds make it impossible for Beauty to exert its attraction. But it is hard to see why an appetitive soul should be proof against eros (the opposite is suggested by the Phaedrus myth), and anyway force rather than eros continues to be invoked to lead the unshackled prisoner to light. So this can at most be a small part of the explanation. another. In this backwards-looking role, as I noted above, the Cave is introduced as totally general in its application-as being about us-with the ascent introduced in correspondingly general terms. And if ascent is at all possible without the intervention of a Socrates-like figure, then (like the 'curricular' reading) the 'Socratic' reading of the ascent fails to make good on this claim to universality. The Cave ascent can be reduced neither to a depiction of Socratic dialectic nor to a sketch of education in the kallipolis.
A first step towards a solution is to understand the talk of compulsion in the ascent as intentionally ambiguous between the 'curricular' and the 'Socratic' readings. Neither reading alone will work for all possible cases: it is not true that ascent always requires intervention by a bullying wise man, nor that it requires the precisely defined curriculum of the kallipolis. The advantage of the language of anankê is that it allows for both possibilities. Thus it tacitly admits a certain pluralism into the apparently monolithic framework of the allegory: in practice, there may be very different paths to epistemic ascent.
It might be objected that these are two very different kinds of necessity, so much so that it is awkward if not impossible to see Plato as intending both at once. But it is important to note that énãgkh is a highly flexible term, 17 which (so far as I can see) Plato never attempts to restrict, redefine, or use in a proprietary sense. 18 Rather, Plato uses énãgkh and its cognates with much the same range of meanings and overtones as we use the concept of necessity or compulsion today. (Its most habitual usage in the dialogues seems to be simply for what must be so, as when énãgkh is used as a formula of assent. 19 ) Its senses in particular contexts are largely determined by those contexts, and what determinacy it has typically comes from an implicit or explicit contrast with some opposite. To take just a few instances, the necessary énagka›on and its cognates may denote the unattractive 10 17 Cf. Aristotle's accurately polymorphous account of énagka›on in Metaphysics v 5.1015a20-b15: its senses include what is required for life; or required for some good or the removal of some evil; force and what is forced; and is what inexorable or could not be otherwise.
18 Important Platonic uses of énãgkh include Symposium 195c-197c (where Agathon seems to rewrite Hesiod so as to oppose eros to necessity), the somewhat mysterious Republic 493c-d and 616b-621b, Timaeus 47e-48b, 53d, Laws 818a-d, and Epinomis 982b-e. On necessity in the Timaeus, cf. Cornford 1937 , Morrow 1950 , Strange 1985 , and Mason 2006 . I cannot here discuss the complex and obviously relevant pre-Platonic history of the term énãgkh, which is prominent in a number of Presocratic cosmogonies as well as in the poetic tradition. (Much of the relevant material is collected in Schreckenberg 1964.) I suspect that outside of the mythic-cosmological context of the Myth of Er (where Necessity perhaps recalls Parmenides' goddess, cf. Parmenides B8.30, B10.6, A37), Plato's use of the concept is informed less by its Presocratic significance than by the wide-ranging popular and literary usage. (In fact, given the powers ascribed to divine ÉAnãgkh by Presocratic authors, its reduction to a merely subordinate cause in the Timaeus must have been quite a shocking and paradoxical innovation.) On Homeric and other early usage of énãgkh, cf. Parry 1986, 257: 'Anankê in Homer means essentially "force", as applied by someone or something in the position of master over slave. Submission to such force is implicitly an unpleasant condition'; cf. also Williams 1993, ch. 4. 19 Taking Republic i as an example, we find five instances of énãgkh as an assent, alone or in a brief phrase (333d10, 335b12, 335c5, 349e15, 353e6); three similar uses for a point that is logically entailed (335c7, 350a10, 353e4) ; one for what is practically required for some result (351b8); and twice for practical compulsion (347c1, c3).
as opposed to the naturally desirable (Rep. 347d1, 358c3, 360c7, 540b4) , the imperative as opposed to the optional (369d11, 373a5, b3, e1), 20 the irreplaceable as opposed to the worthless (540d7-e1, 574c1-2), or the unavoidable as opposed to the preferable (493c4-5, 613a2). Necessity (ÉAnãgkh), beside being a cosmic force of inevitability and mother of the Fates (Rep. 616c-617d) , is what overcomes reluctance (347b10-c3), contrasts with persuasion (519e4), and is logically required or entailed (Timaeus 28c3, 29b1); it is also the set of physical constraints that fix the scope and limits of intelligent design (Timaeus 48a1-4, 68e1-2). This last opposition, particularly prominent in the Timaeus, is certainly the most philosophically significant use Plato makes of Necessity, and we might expect it to fix the reference of the term, restricting it to the realm of irrational material forces. But the Epinomis, in arguing that the orderly motions of the heavenly bodies reveal them to be intelligent, insists on the contrary:
The necessity of the soul that possesses intelligence is far the most powerful of all necessities. For it is a ruler, not a subject, and so ordains its decrees. When a soul reaches the best decision in accordance with the best intelligence, the result, which is truly to its mind, is perfectly unalterable. 21 (982b5-c3) So necessity may be internal, a function of a thing's nature; or external, as what overcomes and 'drags' that nature. It may take the form of rational authority, passive resistance (as on the part of the Receptacle) or physical violence. If there is a common denominator-a core concept of 'necessity' lurking in Platonic usageit is the one brought out by the Epinomis passage: necessity is simply what determines some outcome, whether by overcoming resistance or by presenting it. 22 Nous is the limiting case since its decrees face no internal resistance: thus its activities can either be counted as most necessary of all (as in the Epinomis) or contrasted with necessity understood as external resistance (as in the Timaeus).
So to see what 'necessity' means in the Cave allegory we need to ask what conceptual work it is used to do in that context. And here, unusually, its meaning is not fixed by contrast with any alternative kind of cause; the most telling conceptual connection in this context is rather Plato's emphasis on the discomfort of the freed prisoner. This suggests that we should understand necessity in the Cave in purely functional terms, as whatever overcomes resistance; and we should allow that this might take radically different forms within the kallipolis and outside it.
This puts us in a position to turn to the other question with which I began:
11 20 The necessary desires are 'those we can't desist from and those whose satisfaction benefits us…for we are by nature compelled to satisfy them' (558d11-e3); these are opposed to desires 'that someone could get rid of if he practiced from youth on, those whose presence leads to no good or even to the opposite ' (559a3-6, cf. 559b-d, 561a, 571b) . 21 The authenticity of the Epinomis is of course contested, and it may well be the work of Philip of Opus (cf. DL iii 37): my claim is only that its use of énãgkh here helps to bring out the Platonic range of the term. 22 Hence the relation of Necessity, understood as a cosmic goddess, to human fate, highlighted in the myth of Er in Republic x (616cff.). namely, why is there no reference in the Cave to the attractions of Beauty and the motivational power of eros? Given its purported universal applicability, the Cave should allow for erotic ascent: that is, for the case in which an individual's responsiveness to Beauty serves as trigger for reorientation to the intelligible realm. And if we understand the language of compulsion as functional and otherwise underdetermined, allowing for multiple modes of ascent, then the erotic ascent described in the Symposium may indeed be one of them. That is, perhaps erotic ascent is not here excluded after all. But to make sense of this possibility, we have to see how eros too could count as a kind of compulsion.
Now an earlier passage of the Republic seems almost deliberately planted to give assurance on this point. This comes in book 5, where eros provides a segue from the role of women in the kallipolis to a discussion of optimal Guardianbreeding practices:
And since they have common dwellings and meals, rather than private ones, and live together and mix together both in physical training and in the rest of their upbringing, they will, I suppose, be driven by innate necessity (ÍpÉ…énãgkhw…t∞w §mfÊtou) to have sex with one another. Or don't you think we're talking about necessities (énagka›a) here?
Not geometrical but erotic necessities ( §rvtika›w énãgkaiw), and they're probably sharper than the others in persuading and dragging (ßlkein) the majority of people. (458c8-d7) The discussion then turns to strategies for regulation of this potentially disruptive drive, with the breeding festivals of the kallipolis presented as its eugenically-oriented version of marriage.
Eros here denotes sexual desire, depicted as an irrational and disruptive force; and there is certainly no suggestion in books 5-7 that anything like this could be causally involved in philosophical ascent. Still, the important point for our purposes is the emphatic affirmation here of 'erotic necessities': the explicit claim, presented as uncontroversial, that eros has or can have the quality of compulsion. Moreover, the other invocations of eros in the Republic tend to confirm this association of eros with force. 23 Cephalus approvingly quotes Sophocles as describing the loss of sexual desire as an escape from a mad master (329c2-4). Preparing for the argument against the sightlovers in book 5, Socrates argues that the person who really has a desire for something must be the one who, insatiably, desires it in every case, as the erotic man desires boys and the wine-lover wine. Most emphatic and memorable is the depiction of the tyrant as erotically obsessed in book 9. The soul of the tyrannical man is enslaved by eros as a tyrant within: 'When those clever enchanters and tyrant-makers have no hope of keeping hold of the young man in any other way, they contrive to plant in him a sort of eros ( ¶rvtã tina), like a great winged drone, to be the leader of those idle desires that spend whatever is at hand ' (572e3-573a1, cf. 575c8 ). This eros maddens the soul and purges it of moderation, fulfilling its tyrannical nature: this is 'the reason that erotic love has long been called a tyrant ' (573b6-7) . What this internal tyranny seems to amount to is that the tyrannical man's sexual desires become insatiable, and drive him to obtain wealth from everywhere, even by force from his parents and through criminal acts. And this emphasis on the internal tyranny to which the tyrant is subject shapes the whole of Plato's account. The tyrant is always either master or slave, incapable of freedom or friendship; and, Socrates concludes, 'a tyrannical soul-I'm talking about the whole soulwill also be least likely to do what it wants and, forcibly dragged (•lkom°nh b¤&) by the stings of a dronish gadfly, will be full of disorder and regret ' (577d13-e2) .
This coupling of eros and énãgkh (and of both with tyranny) is not a Platonic innovation. 24 In fact, the book 5 reference to erotic necessities could be an allusion to Gorgias' Helen:
And if eros is a human disease and a folly of the soul, it should not be blamed as a fault but deemed a misfortune. For she came (∑lye), as she came, by the snares of fortune, not by the plans of judgement, and by compulsions of eros ( ¶rvtow énãgkaiw), not provisions of art. 25 Euripides' Jason makes the converse point when he says that Medea deserves no credit for having saved his life: for eros compelled her (±nãgkasen, Medea 530]. As in the book 5 talk of erotic necessities, so too with Euripides and Gorgias: eros represents a kind of internal compulsion-that is, a kind of desire so irresistibly intense as to make rational judgements, rival motivations, and social and moral barriers irrelevant. 26 Eros is what overcomes all these possible sources of resistance; eros is therefore a species of anankê. 27 13 24 On the breadth of pre-Platonic and contemporary eros, particularly in more or less political contexts, cf. Ludwig 2002, to which I am endebted for many helpful references.
25 Encomium of Helen 18-19. My translation follows Diels' text and the translation of Dillon and Gergel 2003-especially in, somewhat reluctantly, taking Helen to be the subject of the perplexing ∏lye …w ∑lye.
26 Accordingly, this eros is also recognised as causing extremes of discomfort and disorientation: see Sappho fr. 31. 27 This claim may need further defense in light of an important Platonic passage that presents desire and compulsion as alternatives. In the Cratylus, Socrates compares the two as preparation for a surprising etymology of the divine name 'Hades', asking: 'Of the shackles that bind a living being and keep him in a place, which is stronger, force (énãgkh) or desire ( §piyum¤a)?' (403c1-3). Hermogenes responds that desire is far stronger; Socrates infers that Hades must therefore bind his prisoners with the strongest sort of desire (403c-404a). There is none stronger than the desire to associate with someone who will make you a better person; so Hades must be a sort of enchanting sophist. Here necessity is opposed to the sort of internal, psychological 'shackling' that desire (here §piyum¤a) can achieve. However, this contrast actually supports my more general point. Desire can function as the alternative to compulsion (here restricted to an external force) precisely because it is a kind of compulsion (in the broader sense of a force that overcomes resistance so as to determine some outcome). Desire too has its shackles-ones more reliable than any external force, just as erotic necessities are
The Symposium brings out the more particular point that eros as a cause of epistemic ascent could be understood as a kind of compulsion. In fact, Diotima's account of eros in the Symposium can help to explain why eros has this compelling character. According to Diotima, the lover desires beautiful things, 'that they become his own' (204d5-7); since good things are beautiful, eros looks to be indistinguishable from the universal desire to possess good things, i.e., the desire for happiness (201c, 202c-d) . Eros is something of a shifting target in Diotima's speech, and it is unclear just how the various desires here associated with erosdesire for the beautiful, for the good, for immortality, for 'giving birth in beauty'-are related (cf. Sheffield 2006, chs. 3-4) . In the end, what primarily distinguishes eros is its function of enabling us to give birth in beauty and thereby gain immortality (206b-208e). The desire fulfilled in this way leads some people to beget children, while others generate works of art, political institutions, ideas and theories, and, at the very highest level of 'initiation' and communion with the Form, 'true virtue' (212a). 28 Eros thus emerges as the desire for creative communion with some beautiful object and, through it, for immortality; and this account makes it easy to see why eros would have compulsive, tyrannical potential. To desire erotically is to seek immortality through creative union with something perceived as beautiful: and that is an inherently insatiable desire for what is by nature most powerfully attractive to us. 29 To sum up: the fact that the Cave passage speaks of epistemic ascent as caused by compulsion does not exclude its motivation by erotic desire. For neither compulsion nor eros is quite what we might assume. Compulsion is not necessarily, or even standardly, a matter of external force or violence; and as Diotima explains, eros is not exactly (or at best) a desire for sex. Eros is an desire to eternally possess some good qua beautiful; and desires of this kind are, unsurprisingly, the most intense, insatiable, and therefore compelling-i.e., resistance-overriding-urges we can experience. The desire for wisdom can certainly take this form: in Republic v, the philosopher is first introduced as 'the one who readily and willingly tries all kinds of learning, who turns gladly to learning 14 for most people more forceful than geometric ones. Again, the scope of énãgkh is contextually determined, and what contrasts with necessity in one context may count as a species of it elsewhere. We might again compare the way in which necessity is opposed to reason in the Timaeus, while rational behaviour turns out to be maximally necessary in the Epinomis. 28 Thus Platonic eros cannot be defined as a desire for some specifically sexual satisfaction. We can tell as much from the Phaedrus: if eros meant sexual desire, the first two speeches, in which the 'lover' and 'non-lover' are contrasted as competitors for sexual favours, would be incoherent. There is nothing peculiarly Platonic about this distinction between eros and sexual desire; and the Symposium's expanded or generic sense of eros is not a Platonic innovation, despite Diotima's misleading suggestion that the standard sense is restricted (205b-d). As Ludwig 2002, 121 notes, there is evidence both of a long poetic tradition of nonsexual eros and of a sophistic and philosophical tendency to group multifarious desires under that name (cf. the evidence given in his ch. 3). Generic eros goes back to Hesiod and Homer; Ludwig also notes important uses of eros in non-sexual contexts in Thucydides and Euripides. On political eros, cf. also Wohl 2002. 29 That the Beautiful is of all Forms the most vividly visible and therefore attractive to us is explicit at Phaedrus 250d-e.
